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The phenomenon of infrequent price changes has troubled economists for decades. 
Intuitively one feels that for most price-setters there exists a range of inaction, i.e. a 
substantial measure of the states of the world, within which they do not wish to modify 
prevailing prices. However, basic economics tells us that when marginal costs change it is 
rational to change prices, too. Economists wishing to maintain rationality of price-setters 
resorted to fixed price adjustment costs as an explanation for price rigidity. In this paper 
we propose an alternative explanation, without recourse to any sort of physical adjustment 
cost, by putting strategic interaction into the center-stage of our analysis. Price-making is 
treated as a repeated oligopoly game. The traditional analysis of these games cannot 
pinpoint any equilibrium as a reasonable "solution" of the strategic situation. Thus there is 
genuine strategic uncertainty, a situation where decision-makers are uncertain of the 
strategies of other decision-makers. Hesitation may lead to inaction. To model this 
situation we follow the style of agent-based models, by modelling firms that change their 
pricing strategies following an evolutionary algorithm. Our results are promising. In 
addition to reproducing the known negative relationship between price rigidity and the 
level of general inflation, our model exhibits s e v e r a l  f e a t u r e s  o b s e r v e d  i n  r e a l  d a t a .  
Moreover, most prices fall into the theoretical "range" without explicitly building this 
property into strategies. 
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Ármerevség és stratégiai bizonytalanság: 
egy ágens alapú megközelítés 
 





Régóta foglalkoztatja a ritka árváltoztatások problémája a közgazdászokat. Intuíciónk 
szerint léteznie kell egy nem triviális „tétlenségi” tartománynak, vagyis az állapotok egy 
olyan halmazának, amelyen a vállalatok annak ellenére nem módosítják az áraikat, hogy a 
releváns körülmények változása miatt a közgazdasági alapelvek is ezt diktálnák.   
A közgazdászok megoldása a problémára az egyösszegű árváltoztatási költségek bevezetése 
volt, ami racionális döntéshozás mellett is produkálhat ármerevséget. Ebben a 
tanulmányban egy alternatív megoldást javasolunk, amelyben nincs szerepe a változtatási 
költségeknek, hanem az árazók stratégiai kölcsönhatásainak van kulcsszerepe. Az árazást 
oligopol játéknak tekintjük. A hagyományos játékelméleti elemzés nem képes egyértelmű 
„megoldást” találni ebben a játékban, általában számos magatartás van összhangban a 
Nash-egyensúly kritériumával. Itt tehát létezik valódi stratégiai bizonytalanság, a 
döntéshozók szükségképpen bizonytalanok a többiek viselkedését illetően. Ezt a szituációt 
úgy modellezzük, hogy a vállalatok az árazási stratégiáikat egy evolúciós algoritmus 
segítségével változtatják, vagyis adaptálódnak a környezetükhöz. A modellel elért 
szimulációs eredményeink ígéretesek. Reprodukáljuk a negatív kapcsolatot az infláció 
szintje és az ármerevség között, valamint a valós adatok egyes további tulajdonságait. Ezen 
kívül az árak túlnyomó része az „elméletileg” ésszerűnek tekinthető tartományba esik 
anélkül, hogy ezt explicite a modellre kényszerítettük volna. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: ágens alapú modellezés, evolúciós algoritmus, ármerevség, társadalmi 
tanulás 
 
JEL kódok: L13, C63, B52 
 
 





    Everyday observations tell us that some prices are changing almost continuously. Financial 
asset prices, of foreign exchange or of stocks, are obvious examples. Though most people do 
not buy commodities regularly, it is also well-known that the prices of crude oil, gold, or grain 
behave similarly. On the other hand most prices we meet in shops or kiosks seem familiar, we 
expect that they do not move from one day to another. 
    Infrequent price adjustment has troubled economists for decades. The problem is not the 
lack of change in itself, but the conviction that prices are kept fixed for much longer than 
market conditions, costs, and competitors’ prices would justify.  Intuitively, there exists a 
range of inaction for most price-setters, i.e. a substantial range of “the states of the world", 
where  they  do  not  wish  to  modify  prevailing  prices.  Meanwhile  basic  economic  theory 
instructs us that, at least, when marginal costs change it is rational to adjust prices, even in not 
fully competitive markets.   
According to the prevailing wisdom the stickiness of money prices is the root of the 
ability of  monetary policy to affect (significantly) real  - as opposed to merely  nominal  - 
variables.  It  is  perhaps  less  in  evidence,  but  the  same  phenomenon  is  a  concern  for 
competition authorities, too, as it may signal collusion among market participants.. 
    Economists wishing to maintain the rationality assumption for price-setters resorted to price 
adjustment costs (“menu costs”) as an explanation of price rigidity. The basic idea is that, for 
instance,  the  everyday  reprinting  of  an  elegant menu  for  a  restaurant  is  not  a  reasonable 
option, being too costly. Certainly, similar issues may be relevant for many other businesses. 
However, what about meal prices written on a blackboard at a pub’s entrance? These prices 
appear to exhibit the same stickiness, despite the fact that overwriting them each day does not 
entailing any additional cost. Magazine prices have been one of the foremost examples of 
unreasonably strong price  inflexibility,  but printing  a different price on  each  new edition 
would not entail even a negligible extra cost. 
    It must be the case that the rigidity of prices has more than one reason. In this paper we 
propose an alternative, though admittedly partial, explanation, without having recourse to any 
sort of physical adjustment cost. Rather, we focus on the possible role of strategic uncertainty, 
and put strategic interaction into the center-stage in our analysis.  
    The  main  idea  of  our  approach  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  Price-making  can  be 
considered a repeated game, as firms usually act in markets where there exist identifiable 
competitors. The traditional analysis of these games cannot pinpoint any equilibrium as a 
reasonable "solution" of the strategic situation. Thus there is genuine strategic uncertainty, a 
situation where decision-makers cannot know for sure the strategies of other decision-makers. 
Strategic uncertainty may cause hesitation. If I cut the price would it be interpreted as a signal 
for a "price-war"? Or if I raise the price shall I lose market-share? Hesitation may lead to 
inaction, as we all know too well. To model this situation we follow the style of agent-based 
models. While traditional economics rely on full rationality and on an equilibrium concept,  
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we model boundedly rational agents, thus must assume something about learning. To achieve 
our goal we adopted an evolutionary algorithm. 
    In Section 2 we give a survey of the price rigidity literature, followed by notes on agent-
based  modeling as applied to economics problems. In  Section 3 a traditional approach to 
oligopoly pricing is surveyed. In Section 4 the agent-based oligopoly model is set up, and the 
learning  algorithm  is  discussed.  Section  5  presents  the  analysis  of  the  model,  and  the 
concluding Section summarizes, pointing out paths to further research. 
2  Literature Survey 
The Rigidity of Prices 
    The most salient fact conflicting with price flexibility this presumption has been termed the 
PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) puzzle (Rogoff, 1996), this is the general observation that 
there are large variations across currencies in purchasing power parity, induced by nominal 
exchange rate changes. Due to this and similar empirical findings, price rigidity has become a 
fundamental  assumption  in  New-Keynesian  macroeconomic  models,  that  are  sometimes 
called the  “workhorse” of  modern  macroeconomics (Gali, 2008). New-Keynesian Phillips 
curves  are  derived  from  individual  profit  maximization,  whereby  prices  are  set  by 
monopolistically competitive firms that face costs of price adjustment. As not all prices are 
raised  immediately  following  a  positive  money  injection  demand  increases,  and  output 
becomes - temporarily - higher than normal. (The same with opposite signs happens after a 
monetary  contraction.)    Prices  follow  suit  eventually  resulting  in  a  positive  correlation 
between growth and  inflation. Price adjustment costs imply  –  in contrast to some  former 
theories  - that even foreseeable monetary policy changes have real effects. However, a recent, 
surprising, finding is that prices posted on the Internet, which can be changed very easily, are 
not necessarily more flexible than traditional brick-and-mortar prices (Lünnemann & Wintr, 
2006). This, in itself, shows that adjustment costs cannot be the only explanation for price 
rigidity. 
Several types of price adjustment costs models have been proposed in the literature. 
The aggregate implications of these models are similar, though in no case identical (Roberts, 
1995) Researchers have frequently shown a lack of concern for looking for the "right" pricing 
model, as long as the implications seemed to be in line with macroeconomic data, and one 
should say, with a priori beliefs. 
    In the last decade a series of systematic studies was launched to find out from microdata 
how firms "in reality" set their prices. This literature is surveyed by Mackowiak & Smets 
(2008). One of the studies (Fabiani et al., 2007) was conducted by nine Eurosystem central 
banks, through standardized surveys. It covered more than 11,000 firms. Of the conclusions 
we cite only those pertinent to our paper. First: "The results, robust across countries, show 
that  firms  operate  in  monopolistically  competitive  markets,  where  prices  are  mostly  set 
following  markup  rules  ..."  Though  the  authors  talk  of  "monopolistically  competitive 
markets",  we  believe  that  the  evidence  cannot  really  distinguish  between  "monopolistic  
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competition"  and  oligopoly.  What  is  important for  us  is  the  prevalence  of  markup  rules. 
Second: "Price stickiness is mainly driven by customer relationships -- explicit and implicit 
contracts -- and coordination failure." In this paper we do not address customer relationship, 
but emphasize "coordination failure". Indirectly this sentence vindicates our previous claim 
with respect to oligopolistic versus monopolistic competition. To wit: there is no reason for 
coordination  in  monopolistically  competitive  markets.  As  a  response  to  the  failure  of 
adjustment  cost  models  Rotemberg  (2011)  proposed  an  alternative  in  the  behavioral 
economics style. Essentially he made intelligible the idea that price stickiness can be caused 
by  a  concern  for  fairness  (customer  relationships).  Third:  "Firms  facing  high  competitive 
pressures review their prices more frequently." Below in the sensitivity analyses we check 
whether our model exhibits a negative relationship between the degree of competition and 
price rigidity.  
Spiegler  (2011)  also  analyzes  the  question  of  price-setting  by  a  behavioral  economics 
approach. In his model consumers are antagonized by unexpected price hikes, i.e. facing a 
higher price than their “sampling-based” reference price reduces their utility. He finds that 
this kind of loss aversion (manifested solely in the price dimension of the product, as opposed 
to the previous studies he heavily relies on, which are Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006 and Heidhues 
& Kőszegi, 2008) can reduce a monopolist’s optimal price range thus implying price rigidity. 
It is an interesting question to ask what makes prices change if anything. Papers that 
have addressed this issue usually found that cost changes are more likely to be responsible for 
price change than variation in demand (Bils & Klenow, 2004). 
    Recent research has yielded quantitative results as well. Several authors calculated price-
rigidity statistics for different time-periods, and areas. On a consumer-price data base for the 
US Klenow & Krystov (2008) found that 36 % of all prices are changed in every month, and 
that the mean duration of prices is 6.9 months. More substantial price rigidity was detected by 
Dhyne et al. (2005) for the Euroregion. The respective statistics are 15 %, and 13 months. 
These studies have found substantial heterogeneity across sectors, and as expected, a negative 
relationship between the level of overall inflation and the degree of price rigidity. 
    In our model we use the results of Eichenbaum, Jaimovich & Rebelo (2008), who analyzed 
the price and cost data of a large American chain store retailer. They found substantial rigidity 
for "reference" prices, remaining unchanged on average for a year. What is important for us is 
the finding that reference prices are adjusted whenever they differ significantly from a target 
price defined as average cost times a "required" markup. The authors calculate the tolerance 
level as 20 %. Below we will model exactly this type of pricing strategy. 
Agent-based modeling in economics 
    Agent-based  models  have  been  used  for  some  time  in  economics.  General  surveys  are 
available (Tesfatsion, 2001; Tesfatsion, 2006; LeBaron, 2006). The paper by Heath, Hill & 
Ciarallo (2009) can be consulted mainly from the methodological point of view.  Researchers 
would, in general, like to resolve two issues of traditional economic analysis with the help of  
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agent-based models. First, economists rather than studying complicated market mechanisms 
usually resorted to shortcuts, as the idea of the Walrasian auctioneer. These shortcuts have 
been regarded increasingly unpalatable. However, as oligopoly pricing models have a simple 
exchange  structure  (prices  are  posted,  then  buyers  arrive  and  buy  or  not),  we  are  only 
marginally    concerned  with  this  branch  of  the  literature.  Second,  traditionally  economic 
models assumed something that, with some lack of precision, has frequently been called full 
rationality. This means essentially that agents apply strategies that maximize utilities under 
constraints, and  have an objective (probabilistic) understanding of their environment. Full 
rationality has been seriously put into doubt both in laboratory environments and on the field. 
Despite continuing efforts to save the rationality assumption it has become accepted that other 
research  programs  have  significant  promise  (Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1979;  Gigerenzer  & 
Selten, 2001). Agent-based economic models share a bounded rationality philosophy, where 
decisions are "practically computable", excluding thereby behaviors that even the modeler 
cannot determine. Learning models have a long history in economics (Evans & Honkapohja, 
1999). But one may say that learning is, strictly speaking, meaningless in traditional models – 
excluding  Bayesian  updating  of  probabilities.  On  the  other  hand  agent-based  models 
frequently allow for an endogenous updating of strategies. Learning in the agent-based setting 
was several times reviewed (Brenner, 2006; Duffy, 2006). Though many types of learning 
models  are  in  use  one  of  them  draw  particular  attention  in  economic  applications: 
evolutionary learning (Arifovic, 2000). Our approach belongs to this branch of the literature.  
Oligopolistic markets have been studied by agent-based models. The article by Midgley et 
al. (2007), is an example that addresses the problem from an operations-research perspective. 
The paper whose approach  is the closest to ours  was written by Chen  &  Ni (2000). The 
authors  explore  the  "ecology"  generated  by  evolutionary  learning  in  repeated  oligopoly 
games. Their focus is on the "cooperation versus price wars" issue, and they constrain the set 
of  feasible prices to high (cooperative) and  low (punishing). Thus their  findings are  only 
tangential to the problem of price rigidity. 
3  The traditional oligopoly pricing model 
There are N (i=1,...N) firms  in the  industry, where N is a constant. Time  is  measured  in 
discrete units. Firms produce differentiated goods, and have constant marginal cost in period 
t, evolving according to  0 = i i it c P c , where  t P  is interpreted as the overall price level in the 
economy, and let  it p  be the price chosen by firm i in t. For the demand framework we adopted 
the logit demand function system (Anderson & de Palma, 1992), which can be written as  
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Here K can be interpreted as the absorption capacity of the market. The parameter   
( 0   ) controls for the degree of differentiation. When  0   , products become more and 
more homogenous, and slight differences in prices result in large shifts in demand. Like in 
Bertand-competition, in the limit buyers purchase only at the lowest price. On the other hand, 
when     , consumers buy randomly, each firm faces the same demand. To save space in 
the description below we set K=1, and   =1, but in the sensitivity exercises we treat the 
general case. The role of the last term in the denominator is to make the optimal collusive 
price finite. If it were 0, total demand would be equal to K whatever the prices are, therefore 
cooperating  firms  could  set  “infinitely”  large  prices.  The  formula  implies  that  demand 
depends on prices relative to the general price level.  
Then the per-period profit functions are given by: 
. ) ( it it it it D c p     
    These data define in every period a Bertrand-Chamberlin oligopoly game, for which there 
exists a static Nash-equilibrium. For the case of common costs Anderson & de Palma (1992) 
















   
where 
*
t p is the (common) Nash-equilibrium price. Though there does not exist an explicit 
solution, this equation is easy to solve numerically. Furthermore one can derive the following 















   
These  formulas  show  that  as  N  increases  the  non-cooperative  price  monotonically 
decreases,  whereas  the  collusive  price  monotonically  increases.  The  non-cooperative  and 
collusive prices will be important benchmarks during the analysis of the agent-based model in 
the following section.  
The analysis of the repeated oligopoly game is potentially very complicated (Abreu, 
Pearce & Stacchetti, 1985). It depends largely on the assumptions made on the exogenous 
processes (marginal costs and general price level). Analytic results are usually available for 
specific  and  simple  driving  processes.  To  summarize  results  briefly:  sub-game  perfect 
supergame (repeated game) equilibria lie between the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and 
the collusive (joint profit maximizing) outcomes. In general there exists a bewildering variety 
of Nash-equilibria, if strategies are allowed to be any function of the observable history of the 
market. While repeated oligopolistic pricing games can produce "collusive" equilibria with  
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rigid  prices  in  peculiar  circumstances  (Athey,  Bagwell  &  Sanchirico,  2004).  In  the  next 
section we approach the problem from the perspective of boundedly rational agents.  
4   Oligopoly Pricing by Boundedly Rational Agents 
    We  model  firms  as  boundedly  rational  agents  that  do  not  pretend  to  find  out  what  an 
optimal  pricing  strategy  would  be,  as  optimality  depends  heavily  on  the  reaction  of 
competitors, as well as on the uncertainties of the marginal cost process. They know their 
current costs, but otherwise they have only vague ideas on their rivals’ behavior. Thus they 
know that they can "mark up" costs, in other words in a differentiated oligopoly setting prices 
can be profitably set above marginal cost, even if competitors would remorselessly maximize 
profits. They also know that there is a remote possibility to collude tacitly, and by effectively 
forming a powerful cartel prices can be set "high enough" above marginal costs to achieve 
maximal profits for the whole industry. Furthermore, they know that there is an upper limit, 
even the omniscient cartel would not set infinitely high prices. On the other hand they are 
skeptical,  and  are  aware  of  strategic  uncertainty,  i.e.  they  are  uncertain  about  how  their 
competitors behave and react. This reasoning leads these firms to formulate pricing strategies 
in the following way. 
1. Start with a target markup range, where the lowest markup is higher than 1. 
2. Observe the marginal cost and calculate the target price range. 
3. Check whether your latest price falls into the target range or not. 
4. If yes, do not change the price. 
5. If no, set the new price as a weighted average of your latest price and the middle of the 
target range. 
6.  Observe how strategies work in the market over several periods. (Any strategy consists of 
the target markup range (two parameters) and the weight of the old price.) Then try to imitate 
successful strategies, or maybe experiment with a new one. 
        The change of strategies is based on a specific evolutionary algorithm, i.e. on a generic 
learning mechanism that has been applied in several contexts within, and, mostly, without 
economics. The learning mechanism used in this study has certain specific features. We call it 
evolutionary,  because  in  spirit  it  is  very  similar  to  the  class  of  algorithms  surveyed  for 
instance  in  Arifovic  (2000).  More  precisely  it  is  a  modified  form  of  a  standard  genetic 
algorithm (Haupt & Haupt, 2004).  
For  the  formulation  of  such  an  agent  based-setup  we  have  to  develop  strategies, 
evaluation  functions,  and  evolutionary  operators.  We  must  start  with  the  definition  of 
strategies. Decisions must depend on current marginal costs as a minimum, therefore we can 
transform the pricing problem into a markup-determination problem. (Price equals marginal  
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cost times markup.) Based on the informal argument presented in the Introduction we limit 
the strategy space to three dimensions: 
    1.   Setting the lower limit of the markup, 
l
it  (a positive real number) 
    2.   Setting the upper limit of the markup, 
u
it   (a positive real number) 
    In fact it is more convenient to work with a transformation of the two real variables: setting 
a markup target, and a percentage deviation from the markup target. In any case for given 









it c p   , respectively. 
    3.   Setting the weight of the latest price (  )  in the calculation of the new price when it is 
not between the lower and upper bounds for the markup (a real number between 0 and 1).  
    Then the strategy (decision function) is the following.  
1.  If the prevailing price is between the lower and the upper bounds the price is not 
changed. 
. 1 ,   t i it p p  
2.  If the prevailing price is below the lower bound, or above the upper bound: 
.
2









       
    It must be emphasized that this strategy set is obviously "much smaller", than the set of all 
feasible strategies. It is also more restricted than the set of available Markov-strategies. Still, 
these are not overly simplistic strategies, either. As we have argued in the previous subsection 
due reflection can lead someone to opt for these strategies in an oligopolistic situation with 
strategic uncertainty, thus they are far from being naive. 
    We start by giving more or less reasonable initial values to the three strategic variables. The 
initial values of the lower and upper limit of the markup are set to be equal in order to avoid 
the suspicion of building price rigidity into the model. These values are uniformly distributed 
among firms between 0 and 0.5, while the initial weight of the latest price ranges from 0.2 to 
0.8.  In the initial period firms act according to these (almost) random strategies. However, the 
evaluation phase of each run is preceded by a warm-up phase, exactly in order to minimize 
the noise caused by these initial values.    
Evolution  requires  a  measure  of  fitness.  An  obvious  candidate  is  actual  profits, 
however, intuitively measuring fitness by a single run of profits would be unreasonable. Thus 
we define fitness as the average of profits obtained by a strategy with exponentially declining 
weights.   
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    We assume that after period 1 firms calculate the fitness of all strategies (not only their 
own). However, the evaluation phase of each run is preceded by a warm-up phase, exactly in 
order to minimize the noise caused by these initial values. At the beginning of period 2 the 
strategy of each firm possibly undergoes changes, according to evolutionary operations. The 
first  operation  is  selection  or  reproduction.  We  define  the  survival  probability  of  the  ith 
strategy by the Boltzmann-selection criterion as   

















where  H  is  the  Boltzmann-constant,  frequently  referred  to  as  "temperature".  At  high 
temperatures the selection pressure is low, whereas at low temperatures it is high (i.e. "only 
the best can survive"). Notice, that survival depends on the relative fitness of a strategy in the 
population, thus we model a sort of social learning process. For this purpose, we use the 
fitness-proportionate method, also referred to as roulette wheel sampling.     Thus chance 
determines if a strategy survives or not. A possible interpretation is noise in observation, i.e. 
the  selection  probability  comes  about  from  two  reasons:  firms  can  observe  the  fitness  of 
strategies existing in the market only imperfectly, but tend to choose those that are perceived 
more successful.  
Then the surviving strategies may undergo mutation: each of the three elements can be 
changed randomly. To implement mutation all variables are given a transition probability, 
called the mutation rate. In addition, we specify a continuous probability distribution for the 
mutation. We assume that it is normal, with mean 0, and variance σ². Thus here we must only 
specify the variance. All mutation parameters are exogenous, and they do not change over 
time. 
    After disposing of the problem of strategies surviving selection one has to deal with firms 
whose previous strategy was dropped after the selection process. Our approach is to form a 
convex combination of the old (dropped) strategy, and one of those that have been selected 
repeatedly. This operation is not customary in the literature, one can interpret it as giving a 
certain individual and conservative flavor to the learning process. The weight of the dropped 
strategy is an exogenous parameter of our model. 
5  Simulations  
The Baseline Scenario 
    In this section, first, we report the baseline scenario values of parameters. Then we describe 
the results of this benchmark model which is followed by a sensitivity analysis in which the 
effect of changes in individual parameter values is checked.  
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 1. Number of firms (N): In the baseline model there are 10 competing firms. 
2. Degree of product differentiation ( ): 1 
3. Scale of demand(K): 1  
4. V in the demand system. In the baseline model its value is -1.5c. 
5. Boltzmann-constant (H): In the baseline model H is set to 1. 
6. Fitness function: In the baseline model its quotient is  . 5 . 0    
7. Mutation parameters: The mutation rate is 5% for all the variables. The standard deviation 
of the mutation is 0.01 for the markup target, 0.02 for the weight of the old strategy and the 
deviation from the markup target. 
8. Weight of the repeatedly selected strategy: The baseline weight of the latter is 0.55. 
9. Inflation environment: The overall annual inflation rate is a normally distributed random 
variable with an expected value of 3% and a 1 percentage point standard deviation. 
Baseline Results 
    An important question was how prices generated by the model are related to “theoretical” 
prices,  the  Cournot-Nash  and  collusive  equilibrium  prices.  Using  the  baseline 
parameterization  described  above  in  the  100  test  runs  all  prices  our  model  produced  fell 
within the interval defined by those two values,  
    Another test of the model is to compare its results to actual statistics. This exercise can also 
be regarded as a first attempt to externally validate the model. With the baseline parameters 
the average duration of prices is 6.39 months, and its standard deviation is 2.88. We were able 
to compare these figures with actual inflation data for three different regions.  
Table 1  Inflation data and percentage of prices within the theoretical region 
  Monthly 
inflation (%) 
Standard deviation. of 
inflation 
Percentage of prices within the 
theoretical region 
USA  0.27  0.36  94.7 
Eurozone  0.16  0.20  98.8 
Hungary  0.40  0.69  98.2 
 
    The sources of these statistics are Klenow & Kryvstov, 2008 (Table I and VI, p. 871 and 
886) for the US data and Dhyne et al., 2008 (Table 2, p. 12) for the European data, and Bauer, 
2008 for the Hungarian data.   
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As it can be seen in Tables 2-3, showing average results of 100 runs, the model's estimates are 
realistic. The actual statistics themselves are only broad averages of substantially different 
sectoral data (see Nakamura & Steinsson, 2008, Table 2, p. 1433). 
Table 2 Percentage of prices changed 
  Fact  Model 
USA  36.2  19.8 
Eurozone  15.3  12.7 
Hungary  24.7  29.8 
 
Average duration is a standard and intuitive measure of price rigidity, it is simply defined as 
the average time lag between two price changes of the products in the sample.  
Table 3 Average duration 
  Fact  Model 
USA  6.8  5.7 
Eurozone  13.0  9.5 
Hungary  3.8  3.7 
 
        Another  interesting  question  is  the  model’s  behavior  at  different  levels  of  inflation. 
When the inflation rate is 0, almost total price rigidity arises, i.e. after on average 255 periods, 
none of the firms change their price for very long. On the other hand, in a hyperinflation 
environment, using the Hungarian inflation data of July 1946, the model produced full price 
flexibility. These two experiments accidentally prove that the model is not “empty”, price 
stickiness is not a “built-in” feature of it, but can arise in reasonable scenarios.     
Sensitivity Analysis 
The number of firms is frequently regarded as one facet of the competition on a given market. 
    Somewhat surprisingly increasing the number of firms causes less variability, but average 
rigidity is left unaffected. 
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis – Number of firms 




5  6.40  3.27 
50  6.48  1.39 
100  6.10  1.19 
 
For a given number of firms, and with a given degree of differentiation  increasing the size of 
the market may lead to more security. 
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis – Scale of demand 
Scale of demand  Average duration  Standard deviation of 
duration 
0.5 times baseline  6.54  2.92 
10 times baseline  5.63  2.18 
100 times baseline  3.39  0.80 
 
    We can see that less uncertainty increases price flexibility, which is in accordance with our 
intuition. 
    In oligopolistic models less differentiation means more intense competition.  
Table 6 Sensitivity analysis – Degree of differentiation 
Degree of differentiation  Average duration  Standard deviation of 
duration 
0.1 times baseline  11.076.40  6.22 
0.5 times baseline  7.25  3.08 
10 times baseline  6.13  2.84 
 
One can see that in this agent-based model with strategic uncertainty this translates into more 
hesitation, and more price rigidity. 
    Low temperature is equivalent to high selection pressure. 
Table 7 Sensitivity analysis – Temperature 




0.5  6.99  2.98 
2  6.61  3.93 
5  6.44  2.65 
 
Apparently selection pressure affects price rigidity only marginally. 
The weight in the fitness function can be considered as “memory”.  
Table 8 Sensitivity analysis – Fitness weights 
Fitness weights  Average duration  Standard deviation of 
duration 
1/3  6.07  2.18 
1/10  6.29  2.72 
1/100  6.11  2.21 
 
    The memory parameter does not seem highly relevant, which is good, since this lends some 
robustness to our results. 
Increasing the mutation rates clearly raises uncertainty, and, especially, strategic uncertainty. 
Table 9 Sensitivity analysis – Mutation rates 
Mutation rates  Average duration  Standard deviation of 
duration 
0.01  3.31  1.09 
0.1  7.62  2.97 
0.2  10.07  4.91 
 
    Our interpretation of the model is confirmed by finding that higher uncertainty is 
accompanied by more price rigidity. 
6  Conclusions  
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    Microeconomic research has,  in general,  had a dim conclusion  for adjustment costs 
models: each of them seems to be irreconcilable with some salient features of microdata. Our 
attempt to explain price rigidity by strategic uncertainty of boundedly rational agents is new 
in the literature. We wish to make sense of the idea that “coordination failure” is a major, 
though certainly not unique, source of price rigidity  
The oligopoly model in which we tried to substantiate our claim is fairly standard, and can be 
generalized in several directions. For example we made the simple assumption of common 
marginal costs, but we have checked that individually different marginal costs would not 
change the results qualitatively. 
    It  is  quite  promising  to  see  that  the  model  produces  sensible  results,  along  several 
dimensions. First, it reproduces the negative relationship between the level of overall inflation 
and  price  rigidity.  Second,  most  prices  fall  into  the theoretical  "range"  without  explicitly 
building  this  feature  into  strategies.  Third,  price  rigidity  statistics  are  even  quantitatively 
similar  to  actual  data.  Fourth,  the  sensitivity  analysis  shows  that  parameter  changes  that 
intuitively correspond to higher strategic uncertainty cause indeed more inflexibility in prices.  
    Obviously, this simple model cannot explain all phenomena concerning oligopolistic price 
setting.  Its  extension  into  several  directions  would  test  its  robustness.  There  remains  one 
important feature of data that the model cannot replicate: price wars. To address this issue 
should be our next concern. 
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